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1.  Introduction
Man-made disasters, unlike natural disasters such 
as typhoons, are, in principle, avoidable. We could be 
more prepared: building better walls, driving more 
safely, and educating people better. Theoretically, we 
might consider every possible disastrous scenario 
which might happen in our complex society, even on 
an international level, and set up precautionary or pre-
emptive measures to prevent the possibility of 
disasters or, if that is unrealistic, to minimize the 
expected damages.
We could be even more systematic in our prepar-
ing efforts. We could collect the relevant statistics 
regarding various sorts of man-made disasters and esti-
mate their probabilities. Similarly, we could determine 
the average costs required to prevent the disasters, and 
calculate the benefits we could reasonably expect to 
harvest from our precautionary measures. Based on all 
this information, we could systemize our decisions to 
execute (or not execute) certain measures to forestall 
unwelcome events, and designate how much of our 
limited resources should be allocated to fund such 
measures. If the benefits outweigh the corresponding 
costs, we would be justified in employing some por-
tion of our limited resources (which could have been 
used for other “utility-raising” activities) to execute 
the precautionary measures. This is the basic model of 
cost-benefit analysis, usually regarded by policy mak-
ers and public servants as the “golden standard” for 
public decision-making. On the surface, this model 
appears clear and simple: you implement the policy as 
long as the expected utility which is benefit minus cost 
is positive.
In practice, however, risk management is 
extremely difficult to do. The difficulty arises not only 
from the interwoven complexity of the technological 
systems involved, but also from the intrinsic uncer-
tainty of the risk itself. The first kind of difficulty is 
more mundane (and therefore much more common 
than usually assumed), but critical in the sense that the 
complexity of man-made systems can (and does) often 
frustrate our efforts to fully understand their working 
principles and come up with effective preemptive 
solutions to potentially fatal disasters.
The second kind of difficulty is no easier to deal 
with. The nature of risk can be vague or uncertain. It 
can be vague in the sense that the exact content of the 
risk (if not its consequential manifestation) may be 
partially socially constructed. More and more children 
are now diagnosed with ADHD. Although their inat-
tentive behavior and hyperactivity is genuine, the very 
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classification of these children as ADHD patients is a 
social construct that was only made possible through 
social negotiation between doctors, health care offi-
cials, parents, and other related sectors of society. 
Under different (more permissive or more negligent, 
depending on your value-judgment) circumstances, 
some (not all) ADHD children would have been 
regarded as just noisy, curious kids, typical for their 
age. When we start to look at a “normal” child-devel-
opment process with stricter standards for behavioral 
characteristics, we are able to invent a new category of 
disease and its associated risks.⑵
When the risk itself is a social construct to some 
extent, an effective measure to forestall it must contain 
social restructuring and negotiations, and this is easier 
said than done. One cannot simply add some intricate 
control system to the risky technological system and 
expect it to take care of all the associated risks. Social 
institutions and negotiation protocols must be installed 
to continuously redefine acceptable levels of risk, and 
legitimate methods for dealing with risk must be deter-
mined. Further, the question remains as to whether it 
is really worth trying to manage risks rather than sim-
ply dropping the system entirely. As we will see in the 
following sections, these issues do arise in risk-man-
agement in action, despite official efforts to limit the 
issues to purely technical matters. The pragmatic con-
siderations are unavoidable.
Risk itself can be indeterminate in the sense that 
we do not have sufficient statistics to determine eco-
nomically rational policies that deal with potential 
disasters. The necessary probabilities might be miss-
ing due to either our epistemic limits or to the 
intrinsically uncertain nature of disasters.⑶ Under 
these circumstances, we can no longer rely on the 
clear-cut answers of cost-benefit analysis. We have to 
combine a number of heterogeneous factors, including 
explicit value judgment, to arrive at a social consen-
sus. Politics in its original sense of “science of 
government” is badly needed here.
I shall examine two cases of risk management in 
South Korea, one related to American beef and the 
other, nuclear power plants. The first is a case of dra-
matic failure, and the other of continued interactions 
between multiple interests groups. I shall argue that 
successful and democratically justified risk manage-
ment of science-technology systems should start from 
their essentially Janus-faced nature. The unpredictabil-
ity of technological consequences requires us to be 
even more cautious when it comes to calculating the 
expected utilities and costs of a complex technological 
system. The implications of the precautionary princi-
ple will also be discussed, especially in the context of 
national and international responses to global warming 
and climate change.
2.   The American Beef Crisis and the 
Failure of the Deficit Model
In 2008, a very unusual public movement took 
place in South Korea. A public demonstration was 
organized to protest the unclear dealings of the Korean 
government with regard to the import of American 
beef. The risk of BSE (Bovine Spongiform Encepha-
lopathy, a.k.a. “mad cow disease”) was called into 
question by civil sectors with the support of scientific 
experts, and the Korean government, backed by their 
own scientists, vehemently denied the existence of any 
risk. The public demonstration, (accompanied by can-
dles distributed by volunteers) mobilized a hundred 
thousand citizens across the country (see Figure 1).
The so-called “American beef crisis” and its asso-
ciated Candlelight Demonstration have multiple 
aspects and actors including international risk-gover-
nance regimes such as OIE (Office International Des 
Epizooties), and to discuss them all here is not my 
intention.⑷ I am going to focus on one prominent 
event involving the dramatic failure of an old-fash-
ioned model of science communication: the deficit 
model.
Korean government officials and their supporting 
scientists emphatically asserted from the very start that 
American beef was “safe from BSE.” Later, when 
challenged, they retreated to the more defensible posi-
tion that the health risk of American beef associated 
with BSE was extremely low, low enough to be ratio-
nally ignored. This transition from the simplistic 
language of “safe” to the more technical-sounding 
“low risk” reveals how government officials conceptu-
alized the general public in their risk management. 
They tended to think that the public was quite volatile 
(they were right about this, but in the wrong way), and 
likely to be irrationally worried about scientifically 
negligible risks. They also seemed to believe that more 
information would bring more trouble rather than 
more rational behavior. Administrators seemed to 
think that if the public were provided with detailed 
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information about American imported beef, and initi-
ated a very complicated negotiation process regarding 
the immunologically, pathologically, and epidemio-
logically “dangerous” parts of the slaughtered animal, 
the situation would have worsened as people’s outrage 
was fueled by the provided information, leading to the 
invention of more absurd stories. Government officials 
tended to believe (or perhaps wished to believe) that if 
they told the public a sweet spell of safety, people 
would let them do their job without bothering them to 
account for all the complexities of the case.
They could not have been more wrong on this. In 
hindsight, it is rather strange that they did not realize 
the possibility of a serious backlash against their 
patronizing attitude towards the public. There have 
been many cases in Europe and in the US wherein the 
public was not easily persuaded to a scientific view-
point when presented with numerous facts about 
science (for example, when people believed that the 
earth was orbiting the sun).⑸ However, That may be 
true of some well-established facts such as the one 
about the position of Sun in the solar system. In the 
case of BSE, although we do know the basic mecha-
nism of its infectious path, we do not know many 
relevant facts about the disease, let alone any stable 
method to eliminate the risk of getting the disease by 
eating potentially contaminated beef. The facts that 
could be used to placate the public do not exist. There-
fore, government officials tried to wave a magic wand 
to suppress real concerns.
To be fair, it is true that we should not alarm our-
selves over every possible risk. If we did, we would 
have to stop doing anything at all. Even an appropriate 
measure taken against one particular risk may produce 
different, unintended risks. For instance, setting up an 
impeccable national security system could jeopardize 
civil liberties. Therefore, we have to evaluate our 
options carefully before making any decisions in our 
risk-governance.⑹
In order to thoroughly evaluate our options, we 
have to be informed as much as possible, as correctly 
as possible. Guaranteed access to objective informa-
tion about relevant scientific consensus is the first 
condition for productive scientific communication. 
When there is no definite consensus on the issue, all 
available information should be made accessible to the 
public so that people can deliberate on their options 
and choose wisely among them.
In the case of the American beef crisis, there was 
a failure to provide relevant and reliable information 
as well as a lack of substantial relevant facts. Although 
scientific research about the prion mechanism is still 
not complete, scientific experts on prion and BSE had 
accumulated reliable enough knowledge to refute most 
of the safety claims made by government officials and 
their scientists.⑺ In this sense, there was a failure to 
provide relevant scientific facts to the public, and 
mass media’s commitment to present both sides of an 
issue equally did not improve the situation, since the 
safety claims were presented as though they were on 
equal scientific footing with the risk claims.⑻
On the other hand, there was intrinsic uncertainty 
as well. First, uncertainty derives from institutional 
vagueness; that is, who may be considered an “expert” 
Figure 1: candlelight demonstrators marching through the center of Seoul
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qualified to make scientifically authoritative judg-
ments on BSE-related questions? Scientists who sided 
with the official government position by making pub-
lic statement about the safety of American beef 
included medical doctors, molecular biologists, and 
even nuclear physicists. There is no doubt that they 
are qualified scientists in their own fields, but they 
tend to think that their opinions (often prompted by 
their conservative political views) should be epistemo-
logically respected simply on the basis that they are 
“scientists.” However, their epistemological privilege 
should not be indiscriminately applied to specialized 
areas such as the prion mechanism and BSE-related 
questions. When a person has a heart problem, they 
will consult a cardiologist, not an organic chemist. 
Likewise, it is not at all plausible that a physician is 
qualified to fix bugs in my computer program. Being a 
scientist in the general sense does not entitle a person 
to speak authoritatively on any scientific subject 
including, in this case, the risk involved in American 
beef; and yet, scientists in unrelated fields were given 
a voice in what was later called the American beef 
crisis. In this case, the selective ascription of episte-
mological authority to conflicting scientific claims 
was not transparent and the result was a lot of social 
confusion. The same pattern of behavior was repeated 
with respect to another social-scientific controversy on 
the environmental effects of the Four-River project.
The second kind of uncertainty is related to the 
complex nature of risk, that is, its dependency on 
interpretation by one discipline or another. The core of 
the problem is the fact that the risk of an event can be 
defined in more than one scientifically respectable 
way. This is because each scientific discipline has 
developed its own way of defining, estimating, and 
measuring risks according to their own theoretical and 
empirical concepts and tools, which are normally 
incommensurate, that is, only partially overlapping 
and not-entirely translatable into one another in 
Kuhn’s sense. Consequently, in the case of the Ameri-
can beef crisis, a different risk could have been 
calculated depending on which disciplinary expert did 
the calculating. Epidemiologists would have given one 
answer, while immunologists, another, as their evalu-
ating methods are different (social statistics versus 
biochemical pathways). Public health experts might 
have come up with an entirely different probability, 
partly because their concern is more preventive than 
analytic. As the public was not used to this epistemo-
logical pluralism of scientific knowledge, many 
preferred to believe that there could be only one expert 
telling the truth and that all other scientists were sim-
ply lying. It is ironical to observe that people’s trust in 
scientists was compromised mainly because they 
believed in an unrealistic, monolithic ideal of scien-
tific knowledge.⑼
In sum, the Korean government made two differ-
ent mistakes in their risk management efforts during 
the American beef crisis. First, they incorrectly 
believed that the best way to manage an easily excit-
able public was to provide false information, asserting 
that there was scientific consensus assuring the safety 
of American imported beef, while there were in fact 
many uncertainties and real risks. Second, they falsely 
believed that providing technical probability assess-
ment (that is, the probability of getting BSE from 
eating American imported beef was essentially negli-
gible, while the exact value of the probability depends 
on the details of the questions and the models used) 
was sufficient to pacify the public. The first mistake 
shows the failure of transparency in their information 
distribution, and the second shows the failure of the 
deficit model.
3.   Nuclear Power Plants and the 
Need of Risk-Governance
Nuclear power has been controversial at least 
since the Three-Mile Island disaster in 1979, was 
exacerbated by Chernobyl in 1989, and vividly 
reawakened by Fukushima in 2011. South Korea is not 
exempt from this controversy. At present, nuclear 
power accounts for about one third of the total elec-
tricity demand in South Korea, and the Korean 
government wants to enlarge nuclear energy produc-
tion by building more nuclear power plants in the near 
future. Still, the current proportion of nuclear energy 
in South Korea is relatively small, mainly because 
nuclear energy is focused on the production of elec-
tricity.⑽
The so-called nuclear power renaissance is ener-
getically advertised by the former government, 
especially the country’s first export of a nuclear power 
plant to the Arab Emirates. The government empha-
sizes the fact that South Korea is relatively well 
positioned in international competition for a number 
of forthcoming nuclear power plant contracts. This is 
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due to that fact that the country has been expanding its 
nuclear energy industry (training people, accumulating 
construction expertise, building maintenance know-
how, etc.), while the competitors (who were already 
more advanced in nuclear technology) made a “mis-
take” in trying to reduce their dependency on nuclear 
energy for last 20 years. The South Korean govern-
ment and nuclear energy supporters do their best not 
to tell people that these countries might have had very 
good reasons to reject nuclear power. They have a 
strange logic, starting from what they perceive to be 
the indubitably true premise that nuclear energy is 
good. Add another empirical fact: “We are now getting 
ahead in nuclear power plant technology.” The happy 
conclusion is that we are experiencing a nuclear 
energy renaissance!
Proponents of nuclear energy do cite some sup-
porting evidence for their first premise. One example 
is the often-cited, economic advantage of nuclear 
energy and another is nuclear energy’s benefits in the 
carbon-regulation age of climate change. Let us look 
at each and examine their claims more carefully.
Nuclear energy production is generally touted as 
economically efficient, meaning its production cost 
per unit of energy is lower than other energy sources 
such as coal or oil. It is true that the conventional cal-
culation of energy production costs supports this 
conclusion. However, the conventional way of calcu-
lating production costs is faulty in many aspects. First, 
it does not take into account the fact that raw resources 
for nuclear power production, such as uranium, are 
highly concentrated in a few regions in the world. It is 
likely that the price fluctuation of raw resources would 
be more severe than more widely dispersed resources 
such as coal and oil. It is worth noting that renewable 
energy sources such as wind or sunlight are omnipres-
ent. The uneven concentration of raw materials for 
nuclear power plants raises its security costs signifi-
cantly. Although security costs are not always 
conspicuous under normal circumstances, that does 
not mean that the costs do not exist and we are safe to 
ignore them.
Secondly, and more seriously, the conventional 
calculation simply omits an incalculable cost alto-
gether; that is, the maintenance costs of highly 
dangerous nuclear waste that will be around for at 
least for ten thousand years). Used nuclear fuel and 
contaminated materials necessarily emitted during 
nuclear energy production exude radiation at fatal 
level for many years to come. In order to prevent the 
hazardous consequences of radiation, an ultra-high 
level security system must be set up and maintained 
for many years as well. The cost for this is not 
included in the conventional calculation. The only part 
of the costs for dealing with nuclear wastes is the 
demolition cost of a nonoperational nuclear power 
plant, and even this is routinely and notoriously under-
estimated. If we properly calculate the real total cost 
for nuclear power production, taking into account its 
entire energy production cycle, nuclear energy looks 
disastrous even in purely economic terms.
There is a relatively new and fashionable claim 
that nuclear energy is clean and “green”. This claim 
relies on another calculation that CO2 emission during 
nuclear energy production is moderate compared to 
other ways of producing energy such as thermo power 
plants using coal or oil. Nuclear energy production, 
however, is not completely CO2 free, even though the 
“green energy” labeling is likely to mislead people 
into believing otherwise. Given its relative advantage 
in contributing to our international effort to reduce 
CO2 emissions as quickly as possible to slow the rate 
of climate change, some countries are seriously con-
sidering using existing nuclear power production 
facilities as much as possible.
It is not however that apart from notable excep-
tions such as France and China, most countries are 
trying to use up their remaining plants as a sort of 
bridging technology that allows them to go to the fully 
green energy stage, perhaps envisioned in Rifkin’s 
recent book, The Third Industrial Revolution.⑾ The 
reason is obvious: nobody would want to use poten-
tially disastrous tools to prevent another potentially 
disastrous event in the long run.
A more sensible course of action would be to find 
a more sustainable solution to the problem. Currently, 
the best candidate for a satisfactory solution is recy-
cled energy such as sunlight, sunheat, wind, etc. There 
are many difficulties to overcome with regard to 
developing the use of these resources, including low-
ering the energy production costs, developing an 
efficient storage system, building a smart grid net-
work, renovating the energy production-consumption 
pattern, and so on. International coordination of 
energy consumption is also crucial to obtaining a sta-
ble energy regime on earth.⑿ These are daunting 
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tasks, but it is not clear whether the problems relating 
to nuclear energy production are any less daunting. If 
we recall just the astronomical costs to just keep safe 
the nuclear waste for millions years and the technical 
difficulties involving such task, we can realize the 
nuclear energy production is full of unsavory surprise.
Finally, we have to realize that nuclear energy 
production tends to foster an authoritarian governance 
structure. This is because the very existence of nuclear 
power plants poses a number of high-risk security 
issues. There is the genuine possibility of nuclear ter-
rorism and other misuse of radioactive materials. That 
is why all the nuclear power plants in the world are 
under constant surveillance. To maintain this high 
level surveillance for many, many years is a truly unat-
tainable goal, especially since it has to be done no 
matter what political turmoil and economic crises 
might occur in the region. Considering all this, nuclear 
energy does not look so clean or green anymore.
I do not appeal to environmentalism or any other 
potentially controversial claims about how to organize 
our lives and society. I want to highlight the fact that, 
without any help from any ideal-sounding claims, we 
can rationally judge that nuclear power plants must 
disappear as soon as possible. Even the very narrow 
economic consideration, with proper cost-benefit anal-
ysis, supports this view.
While the need to abolish nuclear energy is 
strong, that does not mean that nuclear power plants 
can simply be abolished now and forever. There has to 
be a rather long (hopefully, not too long) transition 
period, bridging our current mode of energy produc-
tion to a better, more sustainable energy production 
system. During the transition period, we need an intel-
ligent risk-governance reinforced by transparent risk-
communication. We should never try to mislead the 
public, indicating that they can remain in this unsus-
tainable way of energy production and consumption. 
We should start building institutions that will allow us 
to get through the transition as smoothly as possible. 
Simultaneously, we must control the intrinsic risk 
associated with nuclear power plants with a more open 
attitude, meaning willing to take a more ‘inclusive’ 
protocols in relevant decision-making. Complex sys-
tems like nuclear power plants are not likely to be 
immune from accidents. Better communication with 
residents around plant sites, coupled with a public 
guarantee to access maintenance information, will 
help build the trust among people that is crucial to 
support the temporary and safe working of the plants.
4.   Concluding Remarks: 
Cost-Benefit Analysis and 
the Precautionary Principle
The two failed cases of risk management dis-
cussed in this paper illustrate the need for an extended 
concept of risk-governance; that is, a more participa-
tory, transparent structure of risk management that 
gets interest groups involved and reflects citizens’ 
opinions on governing the intrinsic risks associated 
with complex technological systems such as interna-
tional epidemic control or nuclear power production.⒀
Still, there is another deeper aspect of these two 
failures. They show the conceptual limitation of cost-
benefit analysis itself, and the need for properly 
understanding the precautionary principle. Cost-bene-
fit analysis is strongly favored by government officials 
because of its intuitive justifiability. If we have a 
potential risk to deal with, let us calculate its expected 
cost and benefit, and compare them to arrive at an 
objective decision. That sounds nice and clear, but the 
appearance of straightforward calculation actually 
hides a certain ethical and institutional assumption.
For instance, the usual cost-benefit calculation, 
applied to our efforts to slow down global warming, 
gives us a negative answer, mainly because without 
suitable institutions such as a universal carbon tax, the 
benefit private industry can get from our actions is not 
that great and the cost appears larger. Costs and bene-
fits can be calculated only in a given institutional 
setting, and if we decide to change the setting for 
political or moral reasons, the results of an objective 
cost-benefit analysis vary accordingly. In this sense, 
the apparently value-free calculations involved in the 
standard economic calculation actually rest on huge 
assumptions about what constitutes an ethical way to 
organize our society and individual lives. If we collec-
tively deliberate, applying all relevant information, 
and come up with a reasonable plan to change our way 
of governing the intrinsic risks of complex technologi-
cal systems, the economic conclusions may be 
appropriately streamlined to suit our vision. Economic 
rationality is important in our everyday risk manage-
ment, but we have to decide how to set up a risk-
governance structure before starting the routine work 
of managing risks. And that is the legitimate way of 
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implementing the precautionary principle, not simply 
foolhardily following the verdict from cost-benefit 
calculations.
NOTE
⑴　An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Fourth 
East Asian Humanities Conference held at Waseda Univer-
sity from December 7-10, 2012. I am grateful for the 
comments and discussions generously offered by the partici-
pants. The editorial advice was also quite helpful. I appreciate 
it.
⑵　For further discussion of this issue, see Hacking 1995. 
Notice that Hacking does not side entirely with ontological 
relativism. He recognizes the clear physical/biological 
aspects of severe mental disease, and he is known for his 
strong realistic position on scientific entities, which he 
believes we can manipulate to produce observable effects. 
See Hacking 2000 and 2002 on this.
⑶　For a classical discussion of the distinction between risk 
and uncertainty, especially in the context of economic deci-
sion-making, see Knight 1984. A more broad examination of 
the distinction, including questioning the legitimacy of the 
distinction itself in actual situations, can be found in Posner 
2005 and Sunstein 2007.
⑷　For a detailed discussion of the role the international risk-
governance regime plays in the case of imported beef in 
South Korea, see Ha 2011. A more internal analysis of the 
case can be found in Seong and Jeong 2008.
⑸　See Gregory and Miller 1998 for a general discussion on 
the problem of the “deficit model.”
⑹　See Sunstein 2005 for a comprehensive discussion of tack-
ling low-probability risk cases. I do think that Sunstein is too 
harsh on the regulatory effectiveness of the “Precautionary” 
principle, but nevertheless, his warning on the misuse of the 
principle is worth considering.
⑺　Professor Hee Jong Woo, an expert in prion and BSE as 
well as an influential critic of the government’s position dur-
ing the American-Beef case, had strongly emphasized this 
point in many interviews and public talks.
⑻　This common tradition of “fair” reporting started as an 
effort to be as unbiased as possible in dealing with highly 
controversial political disputes. To see how harmful this 
seemingly innocuous custom can be when it comes to scien-
tific reporting, see Nelkin’s classic analysis (Nelkin 1995) 
and Oreskes and Conway’s revealing examination of a num-
ber of cases (Oreskes and Conway 2010).
⑼　Similar situations developed in America relating to global 
warming and climate change issues. See Dessler and Parson 
2006, and Oreskes and Conway 2010. For more international 
discussions of the issues, see Bolin 2007 and Giddens 2009.
⑽　For a general survey of nuclear power plants and policy, 
see Kim 2011.
⑾　Rifkin 2011.
⑿　Dryzek 1997.
⒀　I studied the need to expand risk considerations in Yi 2005, 
2010, and ways to increase public participation in technologi-
cal planning in Yi 2011a.
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